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Casenotes
WHEN NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS MEET IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.'
By BIRD H. BIsHop*
The instant case, decided in November of 1953 by the
Supreme Court of the United States points up the necessity
for a searching review of the whole field of the nonresident
motorist statutes now in force in so many of our states.
It is proposed, by tracing the development of these statutes,
to illustrate the impact and ultimate effect of such statutes
upon traditional concepts of the various bases of jurisdiction formerly relied on by Bench and Bar in deciding close
questions raised under the doctrine laid down in Pennoyer

v. Neff.'
In 1906, New Jersey enacted the first legislation- designed to give protection to New Jersey residents against
nonresident motorists. This statute provided that no nonresident owner should drive an automobile upon a public
highway unless he first duly executed an instrument appointing the Secretary of State his agent for the service of
process as to "any action or legal proceeding caused by the
operation of his registered motor vehicle within the state,
against such owner". The statute further provided penalties
for using the highway without having complied with this
and other provisions.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1942, Johns Hopkins University, LL.B.,
1950,
University of Maryland.
1
Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., Inc., 74 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83
(1953).
2 95 U. S. 714 (1877), holding that a judgment by a state court having no
jurisdiction over the defendant was void. It is not the ultimate purpose of
this comment to survey in great detail the problem of what has been the
interpretation given -to the federal venue statute or the Interrelation between this statute and 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1441(a) dealing with removal of
cases from state to federal courts. The author recognizes the problems so
presented and treats herein at p ...
, infra,with the effect of the Olberding
case on Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), and raises a
question of whether Congress should review this field with a view towards
clarifying its position as to the venue situation under the nonresident motorist statutes today.
8N. J. Laws 1906, Ch. 113, Sec. 16(1), amended by N. J. Laws 1908, Ch.
304, Sec. 4, N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) 3431.
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Kane, a resident of New York and the defendant below,
had not filed the requisite instrument with the Secretary
of State of New Jersey appointing him his agent for service, and was subsequently arrested while driving in New
Jersey. He was hauled before the Recorder's Court in the
City of Paterson accused of violating this statute. There
Kane stated that he had been arrested while he was on
his way from New York to Pennsylvania, and he argued
that as to him the statute was invalid as it violated the Constitution and the laws of the United States regulating interstate commerce, and that, further, it violated the 14th
Amendment.4 Both of these contentions were overruled
and he was fined five dollars. On appeal, the conviction
was affirmed by both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey 5 and the case came on
to be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States
on writ of error. The judgment was again affirmed, the
Supreme Court holding that the statute was not unconstitutional.'
The Court prefaced its holding by noting that it had but
recently broadly sustained the power of a state to regulate
the use of motor vehicles on its highways in Hendrick v.
7 and that the power extended to nonresidents
Maryland,
as well as residents and included the right to enact and enforce reasonable provisions to insure safety. In the Hendrick case the Court had stated that "the movement of motor
vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and
serious dangers to the public",7 a and undoubtedly it was
with this statement before it that the Court, in the Kane
decision said:'
"We know that ability to enforce criminal and civil
penalties for transgression is an aid to securing observance of laws. And in view of the speed of the automobile and the habits of men, we cannot say that the
Legislature of New Jersey was unreasonable in believ4Sec.

1 of the 14th Amendment reads:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
5Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594, 80 Atl. 453 (1911).
6Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
7235 U. S. 610 (1915), upholding requirement that a foreign automobile
be registered before entering Maryland.
71Ibid, 622.
8Supra, n. 6, 167.
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ing that ability to establish, by legal proceedings within the state, any financial liability of nonresident
owners, was essential to public safety. There is nothing to show that the requirement is unduly burdensome in practice. It is not a discrimination against nonresidents, denying them equal protection of the law.
On the contrary, it puts nonresident owners upon an
equality with resident owners."
This case made it clear that a state may, without violating the Constitution of the United States, refuse the use of
its highways to a nonresident unless he in turn agrees to
the appointment of some state official as his agent for service in all actions against him rising out of his use of the
automobile in such state. True, a state is precluded by the
14th Amendment from any absolute refusal of the use of
its highways to a nonresident, but this case was authority
for any state to impose reasonable conditions upon nonresidents who wish to avail themselves of the use of its
highways - the condition here approved being appointment of an agent for service.
Eleven years later the Supreme Court was to hear another case, Hess v. Pawloski,9 of a similar nature coming
up from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts"
and rising out of a similar financial responsibility statute
of Massachusetts," the pertinent parts thereof reading as
follows:
"The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and
privileges conferred by section three or four, as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle thereunder, or
the operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle on a
public way in the commonwealth other than under said
sections, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served all lawful processes in any action
or proceeding against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way,
and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process against him
which is so served shall be of the same legal force and
validity as if served on him personally. Service of such
274 U. S. 352 (1927).
10Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 N. E. 122 (1925).
Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 90, as amended by 1923 Mass. Stat., Ch. 431, Sec. 2.
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process shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the registrar, or
in his office, and such service shall be sufficient service
upon the said nonresident; provided that notice of such
service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by
registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and
the defendant's return receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the writ
and entered with the declaration. The court in which
the action is pending may order such continuances as
may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable
opportunity to defend the action."
Hess, a resident of Pennsylvania, while operating his
automobile on a Massachusetts highway, struck and injured
the plaintiff Pawloski, a Massachusetts resident. The latter
shortly filed suit seeking recovery for his damages and service of process was made in compliance with the statute,
Hess having left Massachusetts before suit was brought.
The defendant appeared specially and moved to dismiss on
the ground that the Massachusetts court had no jurisdiction over him and that to allow it to attain such jurisdiction
by means of the substituted service provided for in the
statute would deprive him of his property without due
process in violation of the 14th Amendment. His motion
was dismissed and this action was affirmed by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2 that court holding the
statute to be a valid exercise of the police power. Trial on
the merits was later had and a judgment was returned for
the plaintiff, Hess again renewing his attack on the jurisdiction and excepting to the trial court's refusal to dismiss. This judgment likewise was affirmed by the Supreme
Judicial Court,"3 whereupon Hess sought review by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
After stating the familiar holding of Pennoyer v. Neff, 4
that a personal judgment against one over whom the adjudging court has no jurisdiction is void, the court stated
that jurisdiction could be based upon service on someone
authorized by the defendant to accept the same on his
behalf or as his agent. It went on to discuss the fact that
foreign corporations were frequently subjected to suits in
states where they were merely doing business. The basis
for jurisdiction in such cases, the court pointed out, did not
arise from the fact that they were doing business in the
Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760, 35 A. L. R. 945 (1924).
' 8 Supra, n. 10.
"95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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forum without more, but from the fact that the state, having
a qualified power to exclude such corporations, may, as a
condition precedent to their entry, require them to submit
to its jurisdiction as to matters arising out of the business
there done. Thus arises an implied consent on the part of
such corporations to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
courts of the forum in which they do business on the terms
set out above, and this implied consent served as a basis for
jurisdiction over them. 5 The court reiterated its premise
in the Kane16 case that motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and went on to state: 7
"In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care
on the part of all, residentsand nonresidentsalike, who
use its highways. The measure in question operates to
require a nonresident to answer for his conduct in the
State where arise causes of action alleged against him,
as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method
by which he may sue to enforce his rights. Under the
statute the implied consent is limited to proceedings
growing out of accidents or collisions on a highway in
which the nonresident may be involved.... It makes no
hostile discrimination against nonresidents, but tends
to put them on the same footing as residents ....
The
State's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by nonresidents as well as by residents. Hendrick v. Maryland,1..
. And, in advance of
the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a
nonresident, the State may require him to appoint one
of its officials as his agent on whom process may be
served in proceedings growing out of such use. Kane
v. New Jersey . . . That case recognizes power of the
State to exclude a nonresident until the formal appointment is made. And, having the power so to exclude,
the State may declare that the use of the highway by
the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment
of the registrar as agent on whom process may be
served. The difference between the formal and implied
appointment is not substantial so far as concerns the
application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
15At common law four bases of jurisdiction were recognized: presence,
consent, domicile and allegiance. See Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over
Foreigners,26 Harv. L. Rev. 283 (1913).
10Supra, n. 6.
"Supra, n. 9, 356. Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 7.
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Review here shows that although in both cases there
existed a jurisdictional problem of great magnitude the
Court did relatively little towards clarifying that particular
point. True, decisions were reached in both holding the
statutes constitutional with rather loose discussions of the
doctrines of implied consent and the qualified power of exclusion, but neither took a definitive position as to the jurisdictional problem. 19 Indeed we find the Court in Wuchter
v. Pizzuti a year after the Pawloski case saying:2 0
"We quite agree, and, indeed have so held in the
Pawloski case, that the act of the nonresident in using
the highways of another state may be properly declared
to be an agreement to accept service of summons in a
suit growing out of the use of the highway by the owner
of the automobile,..."
This failure to deal with specifics has been the occasion
for numerous articles and case notes seeking to set forth a
rationale of the real and underlying basis which exists for
the exercise of jurisdiction in cases of this type.2 ' For the
most part these discussed the various possible bases of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, consisting of
presence, consent, domicile and allegiance,2 2 and went on
to point out that the Supreme Court had never held these
to be an exclusive list of such bases of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the writers, with Mr. Austin Scott being the most
vocal, show that the Courts have been prone to cling to
old concepts wherever possible and have not been averse
to using the fiction of implied consent when dealing with
this thorny problem of jurisdiction over the nonresident
motorist. To handle such matters by means of fictions, even
when achieving a sound legal and sociological result, is at
best an unhappy process, and it was urged on the various
state and federal courts handling such matters that they
"See Pizzutti v. Wuchter, 103 N. J. L. 130, 134 Atl. 727 (1926), for a
thorough treatment of the problem in a case dealing with a similar statute
wherein the court adopted the view that the defendant, by acting within
the state, had subjected himself to the jurisdiction thereof based on the
power of reasonable regulation. (Reversed, Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13
(1928), for lack of proper notice to the non-resident.)
oIbid, 19.
214 Wisconsin L. Rev. 307 (1927) ; 13 Tenn. L. Rev. 122 (1935) ; 13 St.
Johns L. Rev. 278 (1939) ; 14 Mississippi L. J. 495 (1942) ; Culp, Process in
Actions Against Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 909 (1934) and Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident
Motorists, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1938). See especially Austin W. Scott,
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926),
written before the Supreme Court decided -the Pawloskl case, supra, n. 7,
arguing that the Massachusetts statute involved was valid.
Supra, n. 15.
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leave fiction to those paid to write it and turn more to the
realities involved.23
The mills of the courts, like those of the Gods, grind
slowly, and it was not overnight that we find them abandoning the implied consent theory and adopting the view that
there exists a new basis for jurisdiction over nonresident
motorists and that basis is found in a reasonable restriction by the state upon the nonresident individual's privilege
of doing a "dangerous" act upon the highway of that state.
The restriction, of course, was that the nonresident agrees
to service of process on a designated state official. It is
gratifying, therefore, to find that such a position has finally
been accepted and that the views of such an eminent scholar
as Mr. Scott have now been vindicated by the Supreme
Court of the United States.2 4
Before discussing the Olberding case there should be
examined three prior decisions which serve directly to
point up the factual situation facing the Supreme Court in
Olberdingand to show the gradual trend of judicial thought
towards acceptance of this new base for jurisdiction in
nonresident motorist cases. It has been noted that in the
Pawloski25 case the plaintiff was a resident of the state in
which suit was finally brought, and the suit itself was laid
in the state court. With the passage of time, of course, many
distinct variants in the nonresident situation began to pre13In this connection note Mr. Scott's masterful presentation and discussion of the -true basis for jurisdiction over the nonresident motorist in the
article cited in note 21, supra, in which he states at pp. 581, 585, that:
"Since the Supreme Court of the United States has held in Kane v.
New Jersey that a state may forbid a nonresident to operate an automobile within the state unless he has authorized a state official to
receive service of process in actions brought against him arising out
of the operation of the automobile within the state, it would seem that
a state may validly provide that the operation of an automobile within
the state by a nonresident shall subject him to the jurisdiction of the
courts of -the state in such actions, although he has not expressly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. ...
"It would seem then that it is possible in some cases for a state to
exercise, through its courts, jurisdiction over a person not served with
process within the state, not domiciled within or a citizen of the state,
and not actually consenting to the exercise of jurisdiction. It would
seem that if a state may, without violating any constitutional limitation, forbid the doing of certain kinds of acts within the state unless
and until the person doing such acts has consented to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of such acts,
the state may validly provide that the doing of such acts shall subject
him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to such causes of
action." Emphasis supplied.
Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., Inc., 74 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83,
85 (1953).
2Supra, n. 9.
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sent themselves, and ultimately the federal courts began
to face the same jurisdictional and venue problems which
had plagued the state tribunals for years.
In 1950 a Delaware resident was injured on a Maryland
highway in a collision with a truck owned by a New Jersey
corporation doing business in Maryland. The driver of the
truck was a New Jersey resident. Plaintiff, not wishing to
avail herself of the State Courts here, filed suit for damages
in the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland. 6
Both the individual and the corporate defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint for improper venue, citing 28 U. S.
C. A. Sec. 1391 (a) which reads:
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."
In considering these motions the Court pointed out that
the corporate defendant was doing business in Maryland,
had complied with the Maryland statute with respect to
appointment of a resident agent for service, and that its
objection to the venue was untenable in view of 28 U. S.
C. A. Sec. 1391(c).27 As to the individual defendant, the
Court held that his voluntary use of the Maryland highway
was equivalent to a consent to be sued both in the state and
federal courts of Maryland. It said:2 s
"Section 1391 (a) is, of course, literally applicable
to this case and would require a dismissal of the complaint at least as to the individual defendant Dietsche
were it not that by his use of the Maryland highways
and in accordancewith the particularMaryland statute,
he has consented to be sued by the plaintiff in this case.
... It is well established as a matter of federal jurisdiction and procedure that the general venue statute,
being intended for the convenience of the defendant,
may be waived by him, and it has been expressly held
in a number of cases that under the State statutes like
those in Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York, such
a waiver of venue provision by a nonresident will be
"Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (D. C. Md., 1950).
MThis section of the statute reads:
"A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes."
Supra, n. 26, 530, et 8eq. Emphasis supplied.
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effective as a consent to be sued both in the State
and federal courts of the State where the accident
occurred."
Several months later the First Circuit, in deciding a very
similar situation, 9 reached the opposite conclusion and
based its decision, as to the jurisdictional problem, on the
act of operating a motor vehicle in the State in question
rather than on any implied consent. In this case the plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut, brought suit in a Federal
District Court for Massachusetts against an Ohio corporation for an accident between them occurring in Massachusetts. The facts showed that the Ohio corporation was not
doing business in Massachusetts thus removing it from the
realm of the Supreme Court's decision in Neirbo v. Bethle°
hem Corporation."
The defendant appeared specially and moved to dismiss
the complaint. The District Court held that the venue was
improperly laid in Massachusetts and dismissed it, 3' and
the First Circuit affirmed on appeal.3 2 The Court pointed
out the fact that under the Massachusetts statute the mere
operation of a motor vehicle in that State by a nonresident
is deemed equivalent to the appointment of the Registrar
of Motor Vehicles as the nonresident's agent for service for
actions arising out of such operation. The Court tacitly
recognized, of course, that the jurisdictional requirements
as approved in Kane33 and Pawloski3 4 are satisfied where
suit is brought in the state courts, but it then went on to
point out the hiatus in any assumption that the same result
should obtain in a suit in the Federal District Courts of that
state. In making this point it dwelt on the true basis of
jurisdiction in such cases, and said: 35
"Here there was no express appointment of an agent
nor any express contemplation of suit in Massachusetts.
The agency of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, assuming for the moment that in law it is such, was not
created by any conscious or voluntary act of the defenv. Fischbach Trucking Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (1st Cir., 1950).
1308 U. S. 165 (1939), laying down the rule that the written appointment
by a corporation of a designated person conferring on him express authority
(in compliance with a state statute) to receive service of process on behalf
of the corporation amounts to a consent to be sued in that state in both
federal and state courts and, thus, to a waiver of the federal venue privilege.
a Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 9 F. R. D. 602 (D. C. Mass., 1949).
81Supra, n. 29.
Supra, n. 6.
Supra, n. 9.
Supra, n. 29, 55, et seq. Emphasis supplied.
2Martin
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dant directed to that end. It is one wholly imposed by
command of the law upon the doing of an act by the
defendant, that is, the operation of a motor vehicle in
the state. That act was, however, motivated by entirely
different considerations. It would be quite unreasonable to suppose that the nonresident motorist when he
drives across the Massachusetts state line realizes that
he has thereby acquired an agent and has consented to
be sued in the state. The agency thus imposed without
conscious volition cannot realistically provide a basis
for holding that the motorist has voluntarily waived
the federal
venue privilege which Sec. 1391 confers
36
upon him.
"We do not think, however, that the provisions of
the Massachusetts nonresident motorist statute operates to create an agency in any true sense or that the
jurisdiction which Massachusetts exercises over nonresidents under that act is in reality based upon their
consent to be sued. The theory of implied agency and
consent as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist was doubtless incorporated by the
legislature into this statute by analogy to the procedure
which had been developed in the field of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. It may well have been a
concession to the conservatism of the bar which likes
to cling to traditional concepts for support even when
entering new fields. But the inclusion of this fictional
consent does not, in our opinion, provide the real basis
for the exercise of power by Massachusetts over the
nonresident motorist. That basis, we think, is afforded
by the nonresident motorist's act in operating a dangerous instrumentality, a motor vehicle, in the state.
This act gives the state jurisdiction over him to the
extent necessary to require him, by extraterritorial
service of process, if need be, to answer within its
Here the court set forth the following statement of Judge Learned Hand
in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (D. C.,
S. D., N. Y., 1915) :
"'When it Is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have
consented to the appointment of an agent to accept service, the court
does not mean that as a fact It has consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court, for purposes of justice,
treats it as if it had. It is true that the consequences so imputed to it
lie within its own control, since it need not do business within the state,
but that is not equivalent to a consent; actually it might have refused
to appoint, and yet its refusal would make no difference. The court,
in the interests of justice, imputes results to the voluntary act of doing
business within the foreign state, quite independently of any intent'."
See also International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S.310 (1945).
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borders the claims of those who may have been there
injured by his act.
"It follows from what has been said that while the
defendant by operating its motor vehicle in Massachusetts subjected itself to the power of the State to
require it to answer the plaintiff's claim in a suit in a
state court, it did not thereby voluntarily consent to be
sued or waive its federal venue privilege."
In 1953 the Third Circuit decided McCoy v. Siler,37 a
case containing facts strikingly like those above, wherein
an Iowa plaintiff brought suit in a Federal District Court
for Pennsylvania against a North Carolina defendant in an
action arising out of an automobile collision between them
in Pennsylvania. The suit was brought and service was
had under the Pennsylvania nonresident motorist statute.3 8
The defendant appeared specially and moved to dismiss the
action on the grounds of improper venue under 28 U. S.
C. A. Section 1391(a). The District Court granted the
motion, whereupon plaintiff appealed and the Third Circuit
affirmed. The importance here of this case lies in the fact
that again we find a federal court sweeping aside the ancient
and formalized fiction of implied consent in such situations,
saying: 39
"As to the use of the fiction of consent to establish
jurisdiction of a state for suit under these nonresident
motorist statutes we can add little to the discussion by
the First Circuit in Martin v. FischbachTrucking Company,4° ... The fiction of consent did well enough to
provide the foundation for a step in expanding the
jurisdiction which a state may exercise through its
courts ....
"We insist, . . . that there is a real distinction between the cases where a party in fact gives consent
to suit by appointing an officer of the state to receive
process and a case where the party is drawn into court
willy-nilly without any manifestation of consent on his
tT205 F. 2d 498 (3rd Cir., 1953).

18Purdon's Ann. Statutes, Title 75, See. 1201, containing a provision that
suits against nonresident motorists may be brought in United States District
Courts as well as in the state courts in Pennsylvania.
8 Supra,n. 37, 499, et seq. Emphasis supplied.
,0 Supra, n. 29.
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part.... We think that when a motorist comes into a
state and has an accident and is brought into court to
defend himself from the consequence of that accident,
he does not consent to anything. He is in the state's
court because the state has power to bring him there
following his use of the state's highways. It seems to
us unreal to say that he has 'waived' the provision of a
federal statute which gives him the privilege of being
sued in certain places only. It seems to us a fictitious
and illogical jump to reach such a conclusion.
"The settlement of the question here involved is not
one which, either way, will shake the foundations of
American jurisprudence. Nor should it arouse violent
emotions among those differing in opinion upon it.
There is no hardship on the plaintiff if he cannot get
into federal court in... Pennsylvania. The state court
is open to him.... The only policy consideration which

is apparent is that we should not be astute to widen
federal diversity jurisdiction."
A few months after this case was decided, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Olberding v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co., Inc.,4 1 which had been coming up on
appeal from the Sixth Circuit" while the Siler case was
being decided. The Sixth Circuit below had held that in a
suit brought in a District Court for Kentucky between
plaintiff Railroad Company, an Illinois corporation, and
defendant, a resident of Indiana, venue properly lay in the
Kentucky District Court. This opinion was directly in the
4 3 and Siler44 cases. The Supreme
teeth of the Fischbach
Court noted this conflict in granting certiorari, and, after
hearing, reversed the Sixth Circuit.
The Court pointed out that the venue provisions of 28
U. S. C. A. 1391 are "not a qualification upon the power of
the court to adjudicate, but a limitation designed for the
convenience of litigants and, as such, may be waived by
them". Obviously then, the plaintiff having brought his
suit in the Federal District Court had waived his right to
protest as to venue. But the defendant still had his right
to protest as to venue until he, by affirmative action, waived
it. Here it had been argued that because of the Kentucky
Supra, n. 24.
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., Inc., 201 F. 2d 582 (6th Cir., 1953).
Supra, n. 29.
Supra, n. 37.
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nonresident motorist statute the defendant had, by making
use of the highways of Kentucky, "consented" to the appointment of an agent for the service of process, but the
Supreme Court, speaking through Frankfurter, J., quickly
swept away this kind of reasoning and set out for all to see
jurisdiction over
its view as to the real basis for a state's
45
nonresidents such as these. It said:
"It is true that in order to ease the process by which
new decisions are fitted into pre-existing modes of
analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect
that the reason why a non-resident can be subjected
to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has
'impliedly' consented to be sued there. In point of fact,
however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on
consent at all. See Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563. The defendant may
protest to high heaven his unwillingness to be sued and
it avails him not. The liability rests on the inroad
which the automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, as it has on so many aspects
of our social scene. The potentialities of damage by
wayfaring motorists, in a population as mobile as ours,
are such that those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against the absentee motorist provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend
himself. We have held that this is a fair rule of law as
between a resident injured party (for whose protection these statutes are primarily intended) and a nonresident motorist, and that the requirements of due
process are therefore met. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S.
352. But to conclude from this holding that the motorist, who never consented to anything and whose
consent is altogether immaterial, has actually agreed
to be sued and has thus waived his federal venue rights
is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland.
The fact that a non-resident motorist who comes into
Kentucky can, consistent with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, be subjected to suit
in the appropriateKentucky state court has nothing
whatever to do with his rights under 28 U. S. C. A.
§1391(a)."4 6
74 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83, 85-6. Emphasis supplied.
will be noted that 28 U. S. C. A., Section 1441(a), which reads:
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
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Thus the transition from fiction to fact, while slowly
and tortuously pricked out, has nonetheless been made, and
these recent cases setting forth the new basis of jurisdiction have now furnished complete vindication for those
views which Professor Scott set forth in his Article some
twenty-five years ago.
It has now been noted that among other things the
Olberding case results in affording recalcitrant nonresident
defendants in such cases immunity from suit in any federal
district other than the one in which he or the plaintiff may
reside. Did Congress intend that the provisions of the
federal venue statute should have such an effect? Let us
review for a moment. In the Neirbo case47 the facts showed
that Bethlehem, a Delaware corporation, in conformity with
New York law, designated William J. Brown as the person
upon whom a summons might be served in the State of
New York. New Jersey plaintiffs filed a bill in the Federal
District Court in New York to stay or set aside a sale to
Bethlehem of property in New York. The District Court
for the Southern District of New York (without reported
opinion) and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 8
dismissed the bill for lack of venue and the Supreme Court
reversed.4 9 The Supreme Court in its opinion gave considerable attention to the venue problem involved, pointing out: 5o
"The jurisdiction of the federal courts - their
power to adjudicate - is a grant of authority to them
by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants
to confer. But the locality of a lawsuit - the place
where judicial authority may be exercised - though
defined by legislation relates to the convenience of
litigants and as such is subject to their disposition."
It went on to note the fact that defendants could and
did often lose the venue privilege either by failure to assert
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action Is pending.",
does not provide a neat method of escape from suit where nonresident sues
nonresident in a state court, and this for the reason that removal from a
state court may only be to the district court having original jurisdiction in
the same area, so that one is precluded from seeking removal from a state
court and then raising his constitutional objections as to venue with the
results noted in the case just mentioned.
,Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S.165 (1939).
103 F. 2d 765 (2nd Cir., 1939).
,Supra, n. 47.
60Ibid, 167. Emphasis supplied.
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it in time, by formal submission in a lawsuit, or by submission by conduct. It said:"
"Whether such surrender of a personal immunity
be conceived negatively as a waiver or positively as a
consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary
preference."
The result was that in Neirbo it was held in effect that
if a foreign corporation filed a specific consent to suit by
appointing an agent for service in another state that consent is broad enough to act as a waiver of the benefit of
the federal venue statute and operates as a consent to suits
in the federal district courts in that state as well as the state
courts. However, when we read the Olberding case we see
that it is the Court's view that no such waiver exists by
virtue of the mere doing of the act of driving in the foreign
state. There is, the Court argues, no real consent here and
no waiver can be predicated upon such act.
In the face of these cases we may well inquire as to
whether the federal venue statute is realistic in a case like
Olberding. If it is valid policy for a state to take jurisdiction because an act was done within its borders,5 2 then
would it not be a logical extension for Congress to act so
as to authorize the federal court in that same area to take
jurisdiction of the same matter. Neirbo tells us that the
federal venue statute was enacted, among other reasons, to
take into account the convenience of litigants. In the nonresident motorist case does not litigant convenience play a
part? A great deal of the heart of any negligence lawsuit
factually is located at or near the scene of the crash. Witnesses might well be available locally who would refuse
to go to distant states to testify as would be the result
federally of the Olberding decision. Thus it appears that
nonresident motorists who as plaintiffs wish to take advantage of the forum offered by the federal courts at the place
of the accident must see to it that they collide only with
residents of such district. Such a result does not appear to
be without its own Alice in Wonderland aura mentioned by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Olberding case and certainly
suggests the advisability of congressional reflection on this
matter thus recently brought to light.
Ibid, 168.
6Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).

